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Abstract:  
To further advance our understanding of the brain, new concepts and theories are needed. In particular, the 
ability of the brain to create information flows must be reconciled with its propensity for synchronization and 
mass action. The framework of Coordination Dynamics and the theory of metastability are presented as a 
starting point to study the interplay of integrative and segregative tendencies that are expressed in space and 
time during the normal course of brain function. Some recent shifts in perspective are emphasized, that may 
ultimately lead to a better understanding of brain complexity. 
 
 
Theories of the brain: a concise history 
How does the brain work? This nagging question is an habitué from the top ten lists of enduring problems in 
Science’s grand challenges. Grasp this paradox: how is one human brain –a chef d’oeuvre of complexity honed 
by Nature– ever to reach such a feast as to understand itself? Where one brain may fail at this notorious 
philosophical riddle, maybe a strong and diversely-skilled army of brains may come closer. Understanding of 
the local principles at play has emerged due to the combined efforts of many scientists: neurons talk to their 
partners by teasing them with charged particles of either excitatory or inhibitory effect, as Nobel laureate Sir 
John Eccles demonstrated [1]. Targeted release of ions was later shown at sites that seem designed for the 
exchange of information: typically the axonal termination of the emitting neuron facing the dendrites of a 
receiving partner [2]. Many of those two-some neural interlocutors build into a reticulum with remarkable 
emergent properties. A booming network science followed, generalizing microscale principles on a large-scale. 
David Rumelhart and James McClelland and many others pursued this connectionist endeavor [3,4]. Putting 
function first, they aimed to model specific aspects of human cognition and behavior such as visual perception 
or language. Others, such as Olaf Sporns devoted much effort to the “neurobiological” fidelity of their inquiries, 
conceiving behavior as emergent phenomenon from the appropriate connectional design [5], which they probed 
either with theoretical connectivity models where brain complexity is carefully thought of [6]; or 
complementarily with empirically-derived models that borrow their connectional blueprints from images of 
“real” brains  [7].  
 
Neuronal relays and the propagation of information 
The principle of synaptic transmission proved to be picture-perfect for a theory of communication, boosted by 
the influential work published in 1948 by Claude Shannon [8]. Transfer of information became a principal tenet 
of brain function, and theories went so far as to conceive of “centers” as final destinations for information to be 
communicated (the concept has now retreated, although it remains perniciously present in neuroscientists’ 
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conceptions of brain hierarchies; an alternate view is that it is the journey, but not an elusive final destination, 
that really matters). This theory of information processing in the brain raises a question that may not have 
received enough attention: can we readily transpose findings from the smallest synaptic level –findings that 
speak of only a pair of neurons-- to larger spatial scales such as neural areas or the whole brain? In all justice, 
countless emergent phenomena were discovered through this extrapolation, both in empirical and theoretical 
work. But it remains an uneasy feeling that so much of Brain Science is built upon the foundation of a pair of 
neurons, outside the context of their networks, and with two open-ended areas of darkness at either of their 
extremities that must be thought of as the entire remainder of the organism’s brain (and body). 
 
Collective power of neuronal synchrony  
We will come back to information transmission later, but let us now explore the matter of spatial scales. As 
humans tend to agree, increased size makes up for smarter brains (disclosure: both authors are human), and 
those bigger brains have room to organize themselves at multiple levels, coalescing into functional ensembles at 
several steps along the way up from neurons to functional areas and to the entire brain [9,10,11]. At larger and 
more integrated levels of description, other ordering phenomena were discovered that brain scientists conceive 
in terms of information exchange as well. In the late nineteen eighties, two groups of scientists, one with 
Reinhard Eckhorn [12] and another with Charles Gray and Wolf Singer [13], discovered that perceptual 
integration (or Gestalt) elicited transiently synchronous action potentials amongst neurons that had shared-
stakes in the sensory object being viewed. Those neurons dealt with separate parts of the visual field, and they 
generally disagreed on when to elicit their action potentials in the regular course of their participation in visual 
function. Somehow however, through the complex labyrinth of the visual cortex and despite the fact that some 
finite amount of time was required to get from any one to any other of them (delays and frustrations manifested 
in their usual asynchrony), they managed to coincide when they responded to the same object. What we knew 
from those neurons is that they “responded” strongly to orientation, fragments of contours with sharp luminance 
gradients. Their synchrony it seems, was a trace of their joint participation in the construction of something 
bigger (the object) than what each of them was about (pieces of contour).  These discoveries resonated with 
earlier theorizing regarding the collective behavior of neurons such as Donald Hebb’s cell assemblies [14] or 
Walter Freeman’s mass action [15]. The findings by Eckhorn, Singer and Gray launched a relentless quest for 
synchrony in all parts of the brain and for numerous functions [16], and took the form of several variants (the 
most basic being coincidence of action potentials and phase-locking of neural oscillations).  
 
Irreconcilables  
Theories and dedicated experimental paradigms were built upon both discoveries of synaptic transmission and 
neural synchronization. And from each side, supporting evidence abounded. In spite of their prominence and 
ubiquity though, the theories carefully avoided confrontation with each other, remaining mostly in the separate 
territories of distinct research groups. One may note already some difficulties in reconciling them. Let us follow 
the two extreme views: perfect synchronization and perfect transfer. If all neurons were completely 
synchronized, they would remain in a changeless state of simultaneity. It is unclear how this system could have 
flows of information from one place to another. On the other end, if each neuron relayed information in a strict 
sense, the system would lack basic simultaneity through which synchronous phenomena could emerge. In their 
radical form it seems, the theories of information exchange qua synaptic transfer or neural synchrony are 
mutually exclusive.  
 
 
Can we find directions in the brain? 
The tension is also visible in some empirical facts. Although directed flows of information in the Shannonian 
spirit do most certainly occur in neural networks, it is indeed quite challenging to track information otherwise 
than in local or statistical sense (by tracking, we mean to follow the path of information on a brain map as one 
would follow any object in motion on a symbolic representation of its spatial domain – see figure 1). The brain 
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network after all, is a web, as Francisco Varela emphasized [17], and one gets quickly lost with all the 
branchings, loops and loops within loops [18,19]; structural features that “distribute” information (albeit unlike 
a postmaster distributes mail). So it seems that transmission principles do not scale well upward from simple 
“channels” of synaptic interactions to the larger and more complex web of evolved brains. Thus, it is without 
surprise that the brain betrays an essential communicational etiquette: its parts do not behave in a sequential -
one-talks-at-a-time- manner (as opposed to the humoristic illustration of Figure 1). It is also overwhelmingly 
clear that “inputs” from the environment do not enter a silent system. Brain parts constantly exchange 
information about their current and past affairs, and what comes in at a given time works more as a 
“perturbation” to an already established ballet, an event that weaves itself within a broader scheme of 
coordinated brain behavior rather than the sole commander of all things present. All of these nuances 
differentiate the brain from a channel in which information is transferred from sender to receiver. This situation 
creates mounting complications. The quest for directional flows in the brain has proved difficult both 
conceptually and methodologically, yet, it has not deterred efforts toward understanding. Mathematical and 
empirical studies aimed at resolving these questions are an active area pursued by many, including our own 
colleagues [21,22].  
 
 
Figure 1: a teasing figure aimed at marking difference between directionality in well-formed Shannonian 
systems (as in this imaginary brain map) and in complex systems such as the brain. In the latter, direction is 
less intuitive past immediate spatial and temporal neighborhoods, and it can reverse across spatial scales of 
observation [20].The question is highly relevant though, when one is concerned with where and how to effect 
changes in the system. 
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Brain organization: synchronization or coordination? 
The second concept, synchrony, also bears its share of ambiguities. The firm ground on which we stand is that 
the timing of neural activity is not left to hazard (as if parts of the brain behaved independently, and were totally 
oblivious of what the others were doing). “When” one brain part behaves influences when others do. And like 
social creatures, neurons also use the power of their numbers to increase their impact, creating collective 
structures that speak from a common voice. A generic name for such behavior is “coordination” [23]. 
Synchrony is a narrower concept, one of several ways for a system to coordinate itself. Though synchrony has 
multiple meanings (and though its study uses a variety of tools across the board), it is easy to conceive and to 
model, perhaps explaining its systematic resort. To be rigorous however, synchrony requires two important and 
inter-related characteristics: first, that the underlying temporal order in which the system is embedded be 
frequency-locked, and second, that attractors have emerged in the system’s coordination dynamics (attractors 
are mathematical structures that entrap the system’s coordination dynamics into persistent, -hard to break- 
states). How to examine if there are attractors in the system from empirical data? We do know how to go from 
theoretical descriptions of dynamics with- and sans-attractors to their phenomenology (using models to create 
data at will), but we are not very successful at taking the return path: demonstrating attractors or lack thereof 
from looking at data, at least for complicated systems like the brain. The other criterion, frequency-locking, is a 
little bit easier. And what the data say is that brain parts exhibit tendencies toward frequency-locking without 
going all the way to being perfectly identical. So it seems, we could be dealing with synchronous tendencies 
rather than synchrony [24]. The difference may seem subtle to some (and some might be tempted to brush it 
aside as noise or measurement uncertainty), but mathematically, it is enormous: it speaks of two entirely 
different species of dynamical systems, as said before, one with and the other without attractors. We are turning 
the spotlight to this distinction because we believe it to be paramount for progress in understanding the brain.  
 
At the crossroads of propagation and synchronization 
We hope that the previous exposé motivated the thought that neural networks neither operate on perfect 
synchrony nor on strict transfer, which is good news as each prevents expression of important features of the 
other. What then is the link between them? Some attempts at studying synchrony and transfer in a common 
formalism have emerged, exceptions to their usual avoidance of one another. One is the quest for quantifying 
directional coupling as discussed above. Another attempt is functional connectivity, a daring concept that Karl 
Friston created on his way to developing theoretical and computational tools for the analysis of functional 
images of the brain [25]. Connectivity deals with ways for information to go from one place to another. Ideally, 
we would be able to measure the connection (the “traffic” between two sites) independently from the state of 
those sites where said traffic imparts effect (as one would measure how many cars travel on the road between 
two cities). If independently measured, large scale connectivity and local activity would be amenable to reveal 
their effect on each other. Since we do not have adequate tools to measure the flow of information in living 
fiber tracts at large though, connectivity is not measured directly; rather it is inferred from the way brain 
components behave. Interaction, it is postulated, has to leave detectable traces in the behavior of its participants. 
Of course, contemporaneous theories have shaped the lens through which scientists have tried to see this 
influence. To make things practical, the assumption was often made that regions exchanging information must 
be correlated or synchronized (connectivity→correlation). Flipping things around for the operational goal of 
quantifying the unquantifiable information flow, “how much regions were correlated” became the proxy for 
how much they exchanged information (correlation→connectivity). But with only this concept of 
synchronization under the scope, we may see a mere fraction of the brain at work, the tip of the iceberg. What if 
most coordinated behaviors in the brain do not fall under our definition of correlation or synchrony? Depending 
on the methods used, that would mean for instance brain regions that are coordinated yet not temporally 
coincident; or assemblies in which self-organization favors a fluid coordination regime sans-attractor (such as 
metastability, to be discussed below) over rigid states of phase-locking. Can we see dynamics in which no 
absolute “order” emerges in space (synchronization) or in time (transfer), and still make sense of it as a means 
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for the brain to function? Those are the dark and uncharted areas in the spatiotemporal organization of complex 
systems – those for which we sorely lack concepts and methods (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: a graph of spatiotemporal organization. The horizontal axis quantifies the degree of order in space; 
order in time is on the vertical axis. Examples of orderly phenomena are propagation and synchronization. 
There are numerous hints that the brain is more efficient with less than complete order in space and time. The 
dark area represents this region with incomplete spatial and temporal order, for which concepts and tools are 
sorely missing. 
 
Enlarging the scope: metastability 
The set of questions above resonates with a recent shift in perspective on brain function, from a primary focus 
on neural synchronization to the broader—and deeper-- problem of dynamic coordination. This shift was salient 
in the editorial introduction to a special issue of Nature Review Neuroscience in February 2010, where the word 
“coordination” occurred 6 times in a short text of 250 words [26]. And this is a concept that is growing 
[11,16,20,23-34]. Coordination includes synchronization as one possible collective behavior, but it also 
considers many other ways for components of the brain to interact. In particular, under certain conditions 
partially synchronized behaviors arise. In them, the parts exhibit simultaneous tendencies to temporarily couple 
and to segregate as independent entities. Such “metastable” regimes, we and others have shown, constitute a 
recipe for complexity [23,11,20,24,28-34]. Why is metastable coordination dynamics of high interest to 
understanding how the brain works? First, it typically arises when the parts are no longer perfect clones of one 
another (e.g. as in computational models built from collections of identical neurons). When symmetry is broken 
and interacting parts are recognized in the diversity of their intrinsic behavior, a more realistic picture of brain 
function emerges (indeed a trend toward studying more diverse associations in the brain may explain the shift in 
perspective, for instance the interactions between neurons and astrocytes). Second, incomplete synchronization 
is more adaptive than pure forms. A fundamental nonlinearity in brain self-organization exists. Too much 
autonomy (parts of the brain hardly ever affected by what others are doing) prevents emergence, integration and 
mass action [35]. Yet, too much integration (for instance the whole brain engaged in a giant common behavior, 
[36]) is inadequate too, because the respective parts can no longer do what they are supposed to do in 
contributing to collective behavior. The parts then have no choice but to behave exactly like each other and the 
richness of their individual dispositions is lost to the ensemble. It is enough to note –as many have--that excess 
synchronization is pathological in the brain, for instance in epilepsy or Parkinson’s disease [35,37-38]. As a 
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result, the ideal place for a brain to exhibit a rich set of meaningful behaviors is in-between integration and 
segregation. This is where the “incomplete” synchronization tendencies - or metastable coordination comes into 
play [20,23-25,29,31,39]. Elsewhere, we have also speculated on the tremendous functional advantages that 
metastability would confer to a system, including speed, flexibility and resilience [32].  
 
Creating a new conceptual framework 
The gap between our current understanding of the brain and the miracles of our mental life and behavioral 
achievements (for example, consciousness and capacity for invention) remains abysmal. Looking through the 
history of science, several paradigms of brain function flourished and then dried up following the ebbs and 
flows of scientific metaphors. The ultimate model, the one that allows to forecast all matters of brain action and 
to design an artificial counterpart of multiple functional prowesses, remains out of sight. Two lines of thinking 
have been much explored in recent times: information transfer and synchronization. Their success owes much to 
the fact that they are special cases and open to quantification. When examined together though, they reveal 
some incompatibilities that seem to require a relaxation of both principles: less stringent temporal order and less 
complete spatial order. To advance our understanding of the brain, Neuroscience must open up avenues to study 
functional behavior in a broader sense. We face two alternatives: to leave it all within the current framework, 
with the approximate truth derived from current theories (the brain “sort of transfers information”, and it 
operates with “near synchrony”), or to face the issue head on with a different theoretical mindset. In the latter 
case, a new phenomenology is up for grasp. It will be difficult to conceptualize, and even more so to observe, 
since it points toward a void in understanding. Modeling approaches can lead the way, by informing which 
observables we can expect to encounter in the coordinating living brain.  And tools will have to be revised or 
built to adapt to this new world, tools that will say for instance, when “more synchrony” is “too much 
synchrony” (astonishingly, this simple question is not built into our current enquiries, despite obvious evidence 
of the ills of excess synchrony). We note that Brain Science is reaching a turning point that may make this 
renewal possible: it shows many signs of its readiness to enlarge the scope on brain function, not least of which 
is a recent outburst of interest in segregation phenomena [40-42]. A new paradigm would help to integrate 
principles that seem contradictory in their radical form: transfer and synchronization, as well as integration and 
segregation. Those pairs of concepts are reconciled under the dynamical regime of metastability [20,43].  
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